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OBVIATING THE NECESSITY FOR CONSIDERATION
IN AMENDATORY AGREEMENTS
EU E. Fhq*
U N a business man is advised by his lawyer that his solemn prom-
v rVise, even though reduced to writing, cannot be enforced against him
for lack of the legal formula known as consideration, his opinion of the
legerdemain of his lawyer rises but his respect for the law suffers. And
when a business man is told that he has no legal redress for the breach of
another's written obligation to him by virtue of the lack of the same tech-
nical requirement of consideration, his contempt for both lawyers and the
law swells to unseemly proportions.
It is not the purpose of this comment, however, to add another voice to
that chorus of criticism which has advocated the abolition of legal con-
sideration as an essential element of a binding contract., Suffice it to say
that other countries have developed their contract law without the re-
quirement of consideration, and it appears that the requirement entered
our Anglo-American system through the back door of ancient rules of
pleading.2 The scope of this comment will be limited to the examination
of one of the practical problems arising from the requirement of considera-
tion and to the suggestion of a workable and'simple solution of it.
Contractual relations are usually initiated in the business world as the
result of bargains or bilateral deals, and hence no difficulty is normally ex-
perienced in finding the element of consideration in the mutual engage-
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'Mason, The Utility of Consideration-A Comparative View, 41 Col. L. Rev. 825, 844-45
(1941); Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to Be Abolished from the Common Law?,
49 Harv. L. Rev. 1225, 1252-53 (1936); Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of
Contracts, 28 Yale L. J. 621, 646 (gig); Ashley, The Doctrine of Consideration, 26 Harv. L.
Rev. 429 (1913); Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N.Y. 164, 167, 26 N.E. 351, 352 (i891); Smith v. Ballou,
i R.I. 496, 498 (185); Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499, 5o6-zo, 21 So. 565, 568-69 (1897);
see Shelton v. Jackson, 49 S.W. 415, 419 (Tex. Civ. App. i899).
2 T Williston, Contracts § 99 (rev. ed. 1936); Jenks, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages
286 (igg); Jenks, The Doctrine of Consideration i6i, 219 (1892); 12 Am. Jur., Contracts
§ 72 (1938); Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. i, 2 (1888); Ames, Parol Con-
tracts Prior to Assumpsit, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 252 (1894); Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note i, at 621.
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ments of the parties. The problem to be considered pertains to one-sided,
gratuitous amendments of ekisting contractual relations. It is encoun-
tered in connection with the gratuitous revision of any and every variety
of contractual arrangement, whether it be'an employment contract, 3 con-
struction contract,4 mortgage, s trust agreement,6 negotiable instrument,7
or contract to buy or sell any kind of property. 8. A typical situation is that
in which a tenant requests a rental reduction and his landlord, recognizing
that the reduced rental will be no less than the market value of the
premises and that his tenant is judgment proof or will be rendered in-
solvent by paying the lease rental, agrees to reduce the rent for a specified
period of time. Then, after the reduced rent is paid and accepted for a
number of months, the landlord changes his mind and claims the differ-
ence between the lease and the reduced rental for the expired portion of
the period and cancels the agreement for the balance of the period. Under
those circumstances the tenant will learn that the law permits his landlord
to be an "Indian giver."9
Such revocable generosity results in grave injustice to the tenant for, if
he knew that he must eventually go through bankruptcy or some other
3Schneller v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 28 P. (2d) 273 (1934) (employee's promise in writing
not to compete, made after oral employment contract),; Benedict v. Pincus, 134 App. Div. 555,
iig N.Y. Supp. 266 (igo9); Swee v. Neumann, 67 Misc. 6o5, 123 N.Y. Supp. 776 (Munic. Ct.
191o).
4 Graef v. Bowles, ii9 Ore. 498, 248 Pac. 1090 (1926); Gotterer v. South River Spinning
Co., I99 N.Y. Supp. 542 (S.Ct. 1923).
s Chilson v. Bank of Fairmount, 9 N.D. 96, 8i N.W. 33 (r899); Wendover v. Baker, 121
Mo. 273, 25 S.W. 91S (i894).
6 Wildey v. Robinson, 85 Hun 362, 32 N.Y. Supp. ioi8 (1895).
7 Parmelee v. Thompson, 45 N.Y. 58 (1871); Pemberton,& Pemberton v. Hoosier & Over-
shiner, i Kan. io8 (1862).
8 McQuaid v. Baughman, 167 Ill. App. 430, 437 (1912) (stock sale); Berlant Development
Co. v. McManus, 97 N.J. Eq. 438, -128 Atl. 785 (1925) (conveyance of real estate); Jeffries v.
Pankow, 112 Ore. 439, 223 Pac. 745 (1924) (conditional sale); Western Lithograph Co. v.
Vanomar Producers, i85 Cal. 366, 197 Pac. io3 (192X) (contract to deliver labels for five
years).
9 Gordon v. Green, 5i Cal. App. 765, 197 Pac. 955 (1921) (revocation of executed as well
as executory portion of rental reduction agreement); Druid Hills, Inc. v. Doughman, 171 Ga.
521, 156 S.E. 229 (1930) (promise of judgment creditor to allow debtor one year to refinance
property in consideration of substantial payment on debt); Fienberg v. Adelman, 260 Mass.
143, 156 N.E. 896 (1927) (gratuitous option to renew lease); Boerger v. Vandegrift, 188 S.W.
948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (promise to reduce rent if lessee would vacate premises promptly at
end of lease); Loth v. I-arris, 76 Misc. 5o5, 135 N.Y. Supp. 553 (S. Ct. 19X2) (promise to allow
lessee credit on rent if he completed alterations he was bound to make). Some courts have,
however, allowed the lessor to repudiate the executory but not the executed part of a rental
reduction agreement. Levy v. Greenberg, 26x Ill. App. 541 (1931); Snow v. Griesheimer, 220
Ill. io6, 77 N.E. iio (i9o6); i Williston, Contracts § 12o, at 417 (rev. ed. 1936).
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form of reorganization to escape his onerous lease, he would much prefer
to do so at the time when his business was in such serious straits that his
landlord agreed that he was entitled to relief from his rental obligation
rather than at the time when business conditions were so improved that
his landlord believed it would be expedient to repudiate the rent reduc-
tion. The landlord, on the other hand, is deserving of little sympathy,
particularly in respect to the expired portion of the rental reduction pe-
riod, because he received during those months all that the premises were
worth and all that he thought the tenant could afford to pay. It may be
argued that when the promisor under a gratuitous amendment is per-
mitted to repudiate the amendment for want of consideration, the prom-
isee under the gratuitous amendment does not merit our commiseration
for he is then required to do no more than comply with his original agree-
ment. The promise in the original agreement, however, should not be any
more sacred than the promise in the amendment, and it would seem that
the most recent expression of the compact of the parties should be en-
forced in preference to a mutually abandoned statement of their inten-
tions.
Preventing promisors under gratuitous amendments of contractual ar-
rangements from having the right to revoke such amendments has been
the difficult task of lawyers representing persons in the position of the
promisee under such amendments, such as the tenant in the illustration
given above. In some states the inscription of the word "seal" after the
names of the parties is still supposed to have its ancient efficacy in binding
the parties despite the lack of consideration.-x Even in such jurisdictions,
however, lawyers are reluctant to rely on the seal as a substitute for con-
sideration for fear that theirs might be the very case in which, if the point
were again presented to a modern court, the court would decide to reverse
the precedents and abandon the hoary sanctity of the seal."" In addition,
10 Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, i91 N.E. 307 (1934);Florida Asphalt Pavement Mfg. Co. v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 76 F. (2d) 326 (C.C.A. 5th I935) (applying Florida common law); New-
buryport Society for Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 192 N.E. 54 (1934);
i Wiliston, Contracts § 2o9 (rev. ed. 1936); 12 Am. Jur., Contracts § 74 (1938). It should be
noted, however, that in these cases and in many of the cases holding that a sealed instrument
need not have consideration, the courts found other consideration besides the seal to make the
agreement legally enforceable.
Ix For discussions of the confusion and uncertainty in many states, including Illinois, con-
cerning the effectiveness of the seal as a substitute for consideration, see The Present Status of
the Sealed Obligation, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 457 (1939); Contracts without Consideration; the Seal
and the Uniform Written Obligations Act, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 312 (1936). In Bender v. Been,
78 Iowa 283, 43 N.W. 216 (i889), the court said, at pages 285 and 2x7: "It .... cannot be
claimed that a sealed instrument imports a valid consideration when it shows, by its own con-
ditions and recitations, that it is in fact not founded upon a consideration."
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many states have declared by statute either that the presumption of con-
sideration in sealed instruments may be rebutted or that sealed instru-
ments shall not enjoy any privileges denied their unsealed brethren.12 An-
other device sometimes relied on is the recital that the tenant has made a
nominal monetary payment, the receipt of which is acknowledged by the
landlord. Aside from the fact that the landlord is usually able to prove,
and is not barred by the parol evidence rule from proving, that no such
payment was made,13 the small payment is never the price or bargain for
which the rent reduction was given and consequently it is not valid con-
sideration.14 Another subterfuge to fabricate consideration for a rent re-
duction consists of a covenant by the tenant, in consideration of obtaining
the rent reduction, to perform some trivial duty which he was not thereto-
fore obligated to perform under the terms of the lease, such as sweeping
snow from the sidewik. Such devices are, however, of dubious utility in
supplying the required consideration for the same reason that the tenant's
payment of one dollar fails to accomplish its purpose, namely, the land-
lord has not, as a matter of fact, bargained to reduce the rent in considera-
tion of receiving the sum of one dollar or the covenant of the tenant to
keep the sidewalk clear of snow.
It is true that the courts have, on occasion, dispensed with the require-
ment of consideration when compelled to do so in order to avoid particu-
larly inequitable results. S Such decisions, however, lacking a frank dis-
X2 New York recently adopted an act which denies legal effect to the presence or absence of
a seal. N.Y.L. (i94i) c. 329, § 2. This statute was enacted despite the New York Court of
Appeals' eulogy of consideration as a protective device. Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 172, 179,
7 N.E. (2d) 89, 91 (1937). Other statutes are collected in i Williston, Contracts § 218 (rev.
ed. 1936); The Present Status of the Sealed Obligation, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 457 (1939); Contracts
without Consideration; the Seal and the Uniform Written Obligations Act, 3 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 312 (1936).
X3 Brinkman v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 120 Kan. 602, 245 Pac. 107 (1926); Kay v. Spencer'
29 Wyo. 382, 213 Pac. 571 (1923); Rest., Contracts §§ 75, 82 (1932); 12 Am. Jur., Contracts
§ 120 (1938); i Williston, Contracts § iiSB (rev. ed. 1936). Contra: cases cited 1 Williston,
Contracts § ii5B, at 4oo-4o nn. 10-12 (rev. ed. 1936); Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co., 236
Ill. i88, 200, 86 N.E. 219, 224 (i9o8). It should be noted that the court in the latter case said,
"It is inconceivable that the money consideration mentioned in this lease [one dollar] was the
real consideration upon which it rested. Undoubtedly the real consideration was the exploita-
tion of the mineral resources ..... "
'4 "Consideration must actually be bargained for as the exchange for the promise. A state-
ment that a consideration has been bargained for does not conclusively prove the fact." Rest.,
Contracts § 75, comment B (1932); Hammond Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 259 N.Y. 312, ifi
N.E. 583 (1932); 12 Am. Jur., Contracts § 75 (i938); i Williston, Contracts § ioo (rev. ed.
1936).
's Devious means have been found to avoid the consideration requirement and to support
gratuitous amendments to original contracts. In Levy v. Greenberg, 261 Ill. App. 541 (i931),
COMMENT
avowal of the requirement of consideration and resting on tenuous reason-
ing applied to the peculiar circumstances of each case, cannot be relied
upon as precedents with confidence.
Section 9 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts endeavors to
lead the courts a few steps along the path of enforcing certain promises
lacking consideration. 6 However, the court under this section must find,
as conditions precedent to enforcement of the promise, that the promisee
has suffered a substantial detriment, that the promisor must have reason-
ably foreseen that his promise would result in the promisee's suffering such
detriment, and that injustice will result unless the promise is enforced.
These requirements are so amorphous and yet stringent that the utility of
the section is bound to be limited.
With the courts so reluctant to repudiate the requirement of considera-
tion and so devious in their methods when induced to do so, efforts have
been made to enlist the legislatures to revise the common law rule of con-
the difference between the lease and reduced rental was treated as an irrevocable gift, and in
Steward & Howell v. Keteltas, 36 N.Y. 388, 2 Trans. App. 288 (1867), the owner was deemed
to have released the contractor for his breach of contract and then the contractor's subsequent
promise to do the work was treated as a consideration for the owner's promise to pay the addi-
tional sum. The latter view is lauded by Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 Harv. L
Rev. SI5, 528 (i899). The court in Coyner v. Lynde, io Ind. 282 (z858), found consideration
for the promise to pay an additional sum by concluding that the original agreement was aban-
doned when the other party refused to proceed because of the inadequate price. In Bishop v.
Busse, 69 Ill. 403 (1873), the court held that the owner was bound to pay the additional sum
he agreed to pay the contractor in order to induce the contractor to fulfill the original contract
by realistically concluding, at page 407, that ".. .. appellant [the owner] could have recovered
the damages occasioned by the breach. But this he may have considered of less advantage to
him than the completion of the building, and if so, that of itself would have been a sufficient
consideration to support the new agreement." Parrot v. Mexican Central R. Co., 207 Mass.
184, 93 N.E. 59o (19ii), states that a promise to pay additional money to secure performance
of the other party's promise instead of relying on the right to collect damages is binding but
warns, at pages 194-95 and 594, that "this limitation is not intended to affect the rule that a
contract cannot be binding without a consideration; but it rests upon the doctrine that, under
these circumstances, there is a new consideration for the promise." In Schwartzreich v. Bau-
man-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, I3 N.E. 887 (1921), consideration for the promise of an em-
ployer to pay a higher salary than provided for in an existing employment agreement was
found in the cancellation of the existing agreement simultaneously with the increase of the
salary, but this result was criticized by Williston, Law of Contracts since the Restatement,
23 A.B.A.J., 172, 174 (1937). In the case of In re Carter's Estate, 70 Minn. 77, 72 N.W. 826
(1897), consideration was found in the payment of a smaller amount to satisfy a liquidated
debt on the ground that the debtor was thought to be insolvent.
' "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the prom-
ise." Rest., Contracts § 90 (1932).
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sideration. Those statutes adopted by a number of states which provide
that all written instruments shall import consideration deserve little atten-
tion because such laws have been construed to raise only a rebuttable
presumption of consideration. 7 A notable step in the direction of elimi-
nating the necessity of consideration from all written agreements was
taken in 1925 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws when they drafted the Uniform Written Obligations Act.x8
Professor Williston says it was intended as a modem substitute for the
common law seal in order to make gratuitous promises enforceable and it
does have that effect. 9 It is wisely limited to written promises, and the
requirement that the promisor must express in writing his understanding
that his promise will be legally binding upon him prevents casual or hasty
promises from becoming more serious than was intended. The difficulty
is hot with the act but with the apathetic reception accorded it by the
state legislatures; only two states have adopted it, the last in 1929.20
The Uniform Written Obligations Act applies not only to promises
made to amend existing contractual relations but also to promises which
create such relations for the first time. However, the crying need, as
pointed out above, is for abandonment of the requirement of consideration
at the time when the parties to an existing contractual engagement desire
to amend it. Many of the cases in which the courts have resorted to ques-
tionable reasoning to circumvent the requirement of consideration have
arisen in the field of amendments to existing contracts.2 ' To meet this
problem the state of New York recently adopted an act providing that a
revision or amendment of an existing contractual obligation shall not be
17 Smith v. Ohio Millers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 330 Mo. 236, 49 S.W. (2d) 42 (1932); Combs
v. Combs, 130 Ky. 827, 114 S.W. 334 (igo8); Contracts without Consideration; the Seal and
the Uniform Written Obligations Act, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 312, 314-I5 (1936); The Present
Status of the Sealed Obligation, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 457, 464 (1939).
z8 "A written release or promise hereafter made and signed by the person releasing or
promising shall not be invalid and unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the writing also
contains an additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be
legally bound." Uniform Written Obligations Act § i, 9 U.L.A. 352 (Supp. 194o). For criti-
cism of the Uniform Written Obligations Act, see Mason, The Utility of Consideration-A
Comparative View, 41 Col. L. Rev. 825, 847 (i94i); Reeve, The Uniform Written Obligations
Act, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 58o (1928); Steele, The Uniform Written Obligations Act, 21 Ill. L.
Rev. x85 (1926); Contracts without Consideration; The Seal and the Uniform Written Obli-
gations Act, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 312, 325 (1936).
19 1 Williston, Contracts § iog, at 374 n. 5 (rev. ed. 2936).
20 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1941) tit. 33, § 6; Utah L. (1929) c. 62, repealed by Utah
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) § 88-1-2.
21 Note 15 supra.
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invalid for lack of consideration so long as it is in writing and signed by the
party sought to be bound by it.22 Such a change in the law is precisely
what is required to solve the problem.
In the absence of such a statute as has been enacted in New York, the
inability of the parties to make a binding unilateral amendment to an
existing contractual relation constitutes a serious defect in our legal tech-
nique. Business men believe that amendatory agreements solemnly en-
tered into should be performed by the parties to them, and whenever such
agreements are broken, business men have the right to expect the law to
supply a remedy. Statements that conduct may be morally wrong but
legally right and that the ethical standards of business are frequently more
commendable than the edicts of the courts are as hackneyed as they are a
condemnation of our legal system. The rules used by the courts in pre-
scribing the rights and liabilities of persons under alleged contracts should
be kept abreast of the standards and customs of upright business men.
The law merchant must continuously be absorbed into the common law23
Inasmuch as the courts and legislatures have turned a deaf ear to the pleas
of business men, a satisfactory technique to achieve the desired end must
be developed within the formulae recognized by the courts. With this in
mind, it is submitted that the rise of the problem in connection with
gratuitous amendments of contractual relations may be anticipated and
N.Y.L. (1936) C. 281, § 2: "An agreement hereafter made to change or modify, or to dis-
charge in whole or in part, any contract, obligation, or lease, or any mortgage or other security
interest in personal or real property, shall not be invalid because bf the absence of considera-
tion, provided that the agreement changing, modifying or discharging such contract, obliga-
tion, lease, mortgage or security interest, shall be in writing and signed by the party against
whom it is sought to enforce the change, modification or discharge." See Kane Realty Co. v.
Nat'l Children's Stores, Inc., i69 Misc. 699, 8 N.Y.S. (2d) 505 (Munic. Ct. 1938); Bond,
Mortgage & Securities Co. v. Surplus Wholesale Corp., 162 Misc. 586, 588, 295 N.Y. Supp. 67,
69-70 (Munic. Ct. 1937), discussing the statute. This provision superseded N.Y.L. (1934) c. 142,
§ 2, providing that a written agreement to extend to a fixed date the payment of any obliga-
tion is valid without consideration. Cf. N.Y.L. (1936) c. 222 (abrogating consideration re-
quirement for releases). The New York legislature at its last session, while abrogating the
effectiveness of the seal as a substitute for consideration (note x2 supra), adopted three acts
abolishing the requirement of consideration, where the agreement is in writing and signed by
the obligor. N.Y.L. (i941) c. 328, § 2, subd. 4 (irrevocable offers); N.Y.L. (i941) c. 330, § 2,
subd. 3 (assignments); N.Y.L. (i941) c. 331, § 2, subd. 2 (contracts where the consideration
stated is past or executed). For a discussion of the recent New York legislation see Hays, For-
mal Contracts and Consideration: A Legislative Program, 41 Col. L. Rev. 849 (194).
23 That the view of business men should have an important effect on the law of consideration
is suggested by Judge Cardozo's statement, "Courts are not to shut their eyes to the realities
of business life." Barkin Construction Co. v. Goodman, 221 N.Y. x56, i61, 1i6 N.E. 770,
771-72 (19'7). Consult Ames, op. cit. supra note x5, at Vi8, 531; Wright, op. cit. supra note
i, at 1225, 1232-33, 1247-50; Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 4X Col. L. Rev. 783, 788 (1941).
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the problem solved by inserting in every contract, lease, mortgage, and
other written engagement having legal consideration a provision sub-
stantially similar to that of the New York statute. The following language
is suggested:
Any and all agreements hereafter made by the parties hereto to amend, change,
extend, revise or discharge this contract [lease, mortgage or other instrument, as the
case may be], in whole or in part and on one or more occasions, shall not be invalid or
unenforceable because of the lack of consideration, provided that such agreement or
agreements to amend, change, extend, revise or discharge this contract [lease, mortgage
or other instrument, a' the case may be] shall be in writing and executed by the parties
hereto.
This provision should operate to bind each party to perform his future
gratuitous promises which constitute amendments of the original con-
tract, despite the lack of consideration for such future promises, by reason
of his promise in the original contract, for which consideration was fur-
nished by the other party, to be so bound. That satisfies the legal objec-
tion. By requiring the future promises to be in writing and signed by all
parties to the original agreement before they become binding, persons
should not find themselves bound by casual or ill-considered concessions.
From a theoretical point of view it would seem that in making the
original agreement, cemented by consideration, the parties could validly
agree that all future promises made by either shall be binding upon the
promisor despite the lack of consideration, whether such future promises
relate to amendments, or revisions of the original agreement or to entirely
different transactions. Suppose such a broad provision were inserted in a
lease and, after the lease expired, the tenant requested his former landlord
to loan him a sum of money and the landlord acquiesced in writing. If the
landlord should change his mind on the following day, before his former
tenant changed his position in reliance on the landlord's promise, it would
seem undesirable, but legally proper, to permit the resurrection of the
provision from the extinct lease to bind the landlord to his promise. How-
ever, so long as the provision is limited to amendments of the original con-
tract, it should operate without undesirable consequences.
Those who have welcomed the requirement of consideration as a bul-
wark of protection to persons induced by unscrupulous tactics to execute
inequitable agreements, such as in the case of a release of liability under a
disability policy given by an injured policyholder to the insurance com-
pany, and those who have condemned the ancient rule under which seals
are permitted to shield such unconscionable agreements from attack, may
fear that the clause suggested above will be employed, for example by incor-
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poration in disability policies, as a tool to render unfair agreements bind-
ing without any consideration.m24 The possible abuse of a convenient device
should not, however, prove its doom.' In addition, it is possible for courts
to set aside oppressive agreements, especially between persons in an un- -
equal bargaining position, under or by necessary expansion of the familiar
concepts of duress, fraud, and mistake.25 It should not be assumed, more-
over, that persons in the position of an insurance company usually effect
settlements which are unduly favorable to themselves. To the extent that
such settlements are equitable, it is socially desirable that they be made
but they will not be made if the law does not protect the paying party by
holding such settlements to be mutually irrevocable. On the whole, the
advantages flowing from the employment of the suggested clause should
clearly outweigh whatever abuses may arise.
To create a change in the common law by individual agreement of the
parties in each transaction is bound to be slow and unsatisfactory as com-
pared to changes effected by the legislature or the courts. We know, how-
ever, that in every agreement, lease, mortgage, or other instrument, cer-
tain standardized provisions, designed to regulate the rights of the parties
differently from the manner in which such rights would be settled by the
law in the absence of agreements by the parties to the contrary, are uni-
formly inserted with little objection from any of the parties.' The general
use of such clauses accomplishes virtually the same effect as legislation or
judicial decisions. The provision suggested above could likewise become a
standard clause of all agreements and, it is believed, achieve salutary
results.27
24 Some Aspects of the Law of Release of Claims in Illinois, s Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 455, 462
(i938), urging that the requirement of consideration is a safeguard, however inadequate,
against the imposition of unfair agreements when one of the parties is at a serious bargaining
disadvantage.
2S Sharp, op. cit. supra note 23, at 785-88, 796; Some Aspects of the Law of Release of
Claims in Illinois, 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 455, 463 (i938).
26 E.g., in leases, the confession clause, provision for lessor's lien on lessee's property, clause
enabling lessor to terminate lease in case of lessee's bankruptcy, etc.; in mortgages or trust
deeds, provision for acceleration of maturity of the principal payments on any default, excul-
patory clauses for the trustee, provision for replacement of lost or destroyed bonds, etc.; and
in trust agreements, the so-called "spendthrift" clause, provisions defining the powers and
duties of the trustee, clause to avoid the rule against perpetuities, etc.
27 If that should happen, it would fulfill, at least in part, the prophecy of Sharp, op. cit.
supra note 23, at 798: "It may thus be that the further evolution of consideration doctrine
will be largely the work of lawyers and judges, in the course of the familiar activities of drafting,
advising, negotiation and litigation."
